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1. Introduction: Understanding the Relationship 
between Policy Design and Program Design 
Program design is part of a general effort on the part of 
governments to systematically develop and implement 
efficient and effective policies (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987; 
Bobrow, 2006). Policy design is typically done through 
the application of knowledge about policy means 
gained from experience and reason to the develop-
ment and adoption of courses of action expected to at-
tain desired goals or aims (Howlett & Rayner, 2013). 
Not all policies and programs are designed in this 
sense, and some programs and policies emerge from 
processes such as patronage, clientelism, bargaining or 
log-rolling in which the quality of the causal or logical 
linkages between different components of a program 
may be less significant than other values, such as politi-
cal or electoral gain or loss avoidance. However many do 
result from more deliberate efforts on the part of gov-
ernments to forge a clear relationship between policy 
goals and the means used to address them (Dorst, 2011). 
Policy design is thus a major theme of contempo-
rary policy research, aimed at improving the under-
standing of how the processes, methods and tools of 
policy-making are employed to better formulate effec-
tive policies and programs, or to understand the rea-
sons why such designs are not forthcoming (Howlett, 
Mukherjee, & Woo, 2014). However, while many ef-
forts have been made to evaluate policy design (How-
lett & Lejano, 2013), less work has focused on program 
design (Barnett and Shore 2009). This article sets out to 
fill this gap in our knowledge of design practices in gov-
ernment. It outlines the nature of the study of policy de-
sign with a particular focus on the design of programs and 
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the lessons derived from empirical experience regarding 
the conditions that enhance program effectiveness.  
In doing so, the article is organized as follows. The 
main segment distills and presents existing knowledge 
about effective practice in program design. By illustrat-
ing programs as an intermediary level of policymaking 
situated between broad policy goals on one hand and 
specific settings of policy instrument combinations on 
the other, this section provides a brief elaboration of 
the evolution of modern principles defining effective 
design. Research findings and evidence about effective 
practice are then used to identify the various design 
needs that must be addressed for effective policy pro-
grams to emerge from a design process. In particular, this 
section derives lessons about maximizing complementari-
ty between policy components, enhancing the goodness 
of fit between program elements and governance con-
texts and understanding the design constraints that limit 
the degrees of freedom available for program design.  
2. The Components of Public Policy and Effective 
Program Design 
In one sense of the term, program ‘design’ is a verb de-
scribing the manner in which the policy formulation 
process creates a program that is sensitive to context-
specific constraints. However, “design” is also a noun 
describing the resulting policy product that emerges 
from the formulation process.  
What is it that is ‘designed’ in program design? 
Here it is important to recognize (see Table 1) that pol-
icies are composed of several elements, distinguishing 
between abstract or theoretical/conceptual goals, spe-
cific program content or objectives and operational 
settings or calibrations (Hall, 1993; Howlett & Cashore, 
2007; Howlett & Cashore, 2009). A policy design con-
sists of specific types of policy tools or instruments that 
are bundled or combined in a principled manner into 
policy ‘portfolios’ or ‘packages’ in an effort to attain of-
ten multiple policy goals and aims. Programs are one 
component or level at which such designs emerge. 
Each of these component elements is conceived 
and created by policy-makers in the course of the poli-
cy-making process. Some components of a policy are 
very abstract and exist at the level of general ideas and 
concepts about policy goals and appropriate types of 
policy tools which can be used to achieve them. Others 
are more concrete and specific and directly affect ad-
ministrative practice on the ground. Programs exist be-
tween these two levels, operationalizing abstract goals 
and means and encompassing specific on-the-ground 
measures and instrument calibrations. 
Seen in this larger context, a policy ‘program’ is a 
distinctive part of a policy portfolio comprised of a 
combination of policy instruments or program mecha-
nisms, arranged to meet operationalizable policy ob-
jectives (Howlett, 2011). Policy programs thus occupy a 
central position translating high-level goals and instru-
ment logics and aspirations into operationalizable 
measures which can be implemented on the ground in 
specific policy circumstances (Guy et al., 2006). 
That is, as presented in Table 1, the elements occu-
pying these different levels of policy design are related 
to one another in a nested fashion. Program design 
thus requires an integrated view of different levels of 
policy goals and means in order to ensure that the el-
ements which compose a program reinforce rather 
than contradict or conflict with either general, abstract 
principles or specific on-the-ground measures and 
mechanisms (Meijers & Stead, 2004; Briassoulis, 2005). 
Table 1. Components of a Policy Mix and the Position of Policy Programs Therein. 
 Policy Content 
Policy 
Content 
High Level Abstraction 
(Policy-Level) 
Operationalization (Program-
Level) 
On-the-Ground Specification 
(Measures-Level) 
Policy 
Ends or 
Aims 
POLICY GOALS  
What General Types of 
Ideas Govern Policy De-
velopment? 
(e.g. environmental pro-
tection, economic devel-
opment) 
PROGRAM OBJECTIVES 
What Does Policy Formally Aim 
to Address? 
(e.g. saving wilderness or species 
habitat,  increasing harvesting 
levels to create processing jobs) 
OPERATIONAL SETTINGS 
What are the Specific 
On-the-ground Requirements  of 
Policy 
(e.g. considerations about sustaina-
ble levels of harvesting) 
Policy 
Means or 
Tools 
INSTRUMENT LOGIC 
What General Norms 
Guide Implementation 
Preferences? 
(e.g. preferences for the 
use of coercive instru-
ments, or moral suasion) 
PROGRAM MECHANISMS 
What Specific Types of 
Instruments are Utilized? 
(e.g. the use of different tools 
such as tax incentives, or public 
enterprises) 
TOOL CALIBRATIONS 
What are the Specific Ways in 
Which the Instrument is used? 
(e.g. designations of higher levels of 
subsidies, the use of mandatory vs 
voluntary regulatory guidelines or 
standards) 
Source: Howlett & Rayner, 2013, p. 8. 
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2.1. An Example: U.S. Conservation Policy and the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) Therein 
Exactly how different abstract and concrete policy el-
ements should be combined to create effective and ef-
ficient programs is the central question and problem 
facing program designers. To illustrate the above con-
ceptualization further, examples from United States 
land conservation policy and a constituent Payments 
for Ecosystem Services (PES) program are presented 
here. The U.S. government through the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) currently makes payments of 
about US$1.8 billion per year through contracts with 
almost 700,000 farmers and landowners, who agree to 
withhold agricultural activity on 26.8 million acres of 
ecologically sensitive land (USDA, 2013). Instead of 
farming on sensitive areas of their land, these farmers 
agree to “remove environmentally sensitive land from 
agricultural production and plant grassers or trees that 
will improve water quality and improve waterfowl and 
wildlife habitat” (USDA, 2013). The largest PES program 
globally is the United States Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram (CRP). 
In implementing the CRP, the high-level abstraction 
of the policy-level (Table 2) includes the general policy 
goals and instrument logics which inform the general 
contours and content of both policy and program de-
sign, as well as mechanism, design. The main goal of 
overall land conservation policy in the U.S. in this sense 
recognizes that most of the benefits obtained from 
ecosystem services, such as water quality, carbon se-
questration, climate regulation, recreation, nutrient cy-
cling, erosion prevention and soil creation occur as pos-
itive externalities or benefits that are unaccounted for 
by the economy. In addition, these services emerge out 
of the preservation of natural systems and their con-
servation is often conflicting with extractive economic 
activities, such as intensive agriculture. In this example 
the conception of ecosystem services and their provi-
sion is a main general idea that governs policy devel-
opment. The idea that payments can be made for the 
loss of ecosystem services is the instrument logic, or 
the body of norms that guide implementation prefer-
ences at the policy-level. This embodies the under-
standing that that since the economy will always un-
dermine the provision of these non-market positive 
externalities, government mandated compensation can 
be used to link the interests of landowners and external 
actors to the conservation of ecosystems (Wunder, 2007). 
Supporting operationalization at the program-level 
is the formulation of policy objectives and the related 
mechanisms that are used to meet them within this 
general policy goal and instrument logic (Table 2). The 
formal objective of the CRP program is the conserva-
tion of a specific set of ecologically vital land areas that 
ameliorate water quality, mitigate soil erosion and di-
minish the depletion of wildlife habitat (USDA, 2013). 
Table 2. Components of the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program. 
 Policy Content 
 High Level Abstraction (Policy-
Level) 
Operationalization (Program-
Level) 
On-the-Ground Specification 
(Measures-Level) 
Policy 
Ends or 
Aims 
GOALS  
What General Types of Ideas 
Govern Policy Development? 
Ecosystem services, or the bene-
fits that people derive from natu-
ral systems, need to be secured 
since they are not accounted for 
and therefore undercut by the 
economy. 
OBJECTIVES 
What Does Policy Formally Aim 
to Address? 
Conserving, re-establishing valu-
able land cover to help improve 
water quality, prevent soil ero-
sion and reduce loss of wildlife 
habitat.  
SETTINGS 
What are the Specific 
On-the-ground Requirements  of 
Policy 
(e.g). Considerations about which 
land area types are a priority for 
the program, mechanisms for 
setting up payment-transfers 
through local agencies.  
Policy 
Means 
or 
Tools 
INSTRUMENT LOGIC 
What General Norms Guide Im-
plementation Preferences? 
Payments for Ecosystem Services 
or the logic that the use of finan-
cial instruments or creating mar-
kets are effective ways to secure 
ecosystem services by transform-
ing the conservation of positive 
externalities into financial bene-
fits for local providers. 
MECHANISMS 
What Specific Types of 
Instruments are Utilized? 
Conditional cash transfers or 
payment contracts with land-
owners to conserve instead of 
develop ecologically sensitive ar-
eas.  
 
CALIBRATIONS 
What are the Specific Ways in 
Which the Instrument is used? 
(e.g) Rate of yearly payments, 
length (years) that contracts are 
valid, enrollment eligibility, , ad-
justing for ecological sensitivity 
land over time.  
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The mechanisms or the specific types of instru-
ments adopted by the CRP program take the form of 
conditional cash transfers or payment contracts with 
landowners to conserve ecologically sensitive acres on 
their land. Supplementary instruments in the ‘package’ 
symbolized by the CRP, include cost-sharing schemes 
by the implementing agency, in this case the Farm Ser-
vice Agency (FSA) active in each state. Specific on-the-
ground measures then involve adjustments to policy 
settings and the calibration of policy tools and tool 
mixes. In the CRP example (Table 2), the specific policy 
settings are the requirements related to the classifica-
tion of land-use, land-cover types (such as wetland or 
riparian buffer zones or wildlife corridors) and the con-
servation priorities assigned to each, as well as other 
components such as how land parcels should be valued 
as well as choosing and setting up necessary payment 
arrangements through local land agencies. These on-
the-ground settings then relate to the specific calibra-
tions of the instruments contained within the CRP, in-
cluding such features as the regular adjustments and 
fine-tuning of payment amounts, contract lengths and 
eligibility criteria based on economic indicators such as 
national budgets and inflation.  
3. Policy Programs and Policy Design: A Short History 
The main emphasis of recent policy design research has 
been on the importance of utilizing the full range of 
policy components available when putting together a 
program while avoiding unnecessary duplication and 
conflicts between program components (Gunningham, 
Grabosky, & Sinclair, 1998). Contemporary design 
thinking additionally recognizes the limitations placed 
on the adoption of program elements by their situation 
within an overall policy framework, and the need to 
match the more technical aspects of government fi-
nancial and human resource availability and capabili-
ties with existing levels of administrative capacity, 
budgeting and personnel resources, and other similar 
requirements of policy implementation.  
Over time, researchers have articulated a series of 
principles to help promote better and more effective 
policy designs. Maxims for effective design developed 
in the late 1950s, for example, focused on efficiency 
concerns and urged the parsimonious use of policy 
tools. An oft-cited rule proposed by the Nobel Prize 
winning economist Jan Tinbergen in 1952, for instance, 
suggested that optimal designs emerged when the 
number of policy tools was directly proportional to the 
number of goals a policy was expected to achieve (Tin-
bergen, 1952; del Rio & Howlett, 2013). This research 
obtained a dynamic component in the 1970s when 
scholars began to deal with questions about the proper 
‘sequencing’ or phasing of policy efforts over time 
(Taeihagh, 2013). Studies by Doern and his colleagues, 
for example, promoted the idea that effective program 
design involved the initial use of the least-coercive in-
strument expected to be able to address a problem, 
with governments moving up ‘the scale of coercion’ to 
use more intrusive instruments to achieve their policy 
goals only in response to the failure of less coercive 
tools to achieve policy goals and objectives (Doern & 
Phidd, 1983; Doern & Wilson, 1974; Woodside, 1986). 
In recent years program design thinking has refined 
and expanded upon these insights. The articulation of 
principles of what constitutes a “good” design has 
evolved from thinking about relatively simple ‘one 
goal—one instrument’ situations to address issues re-
lated to the use of more complex policy mixes or bun-
dles of tools that aim to unite multiple interconnected 
goals and the means to achieve them across multiple 
levels of government (Howlett & del Rio, 2014). Daug-
bjerg and Sonderskov (2012) in their review of organic 
food policies in Denmark, Sweden, UK and the US, for ex-
ample, noted that “significant growth in green markets is 
most likely to result where a combination of policy in-
struments directed at the supply side and demand side of 
the market is simultaneously implemented” (p. 415). 
In pursuing research into the question of how to 
best formulate deliberate packaging of policy elements 
into programs targeted to meet certain policy goals, 
scholars and practitioners have focused on ‘balancing’ 
two aspects of the policy relationships set out in Table 
1. These are the ‘policy-program’ linkages and the 
‘program-measures’ ones highlighted in that table (see 
Table 3). 
Dealing with ‘policy-program linkages’ involves the 
need to set program objectives and mechanisms that 
fit overall, broader policy goals and instrument logics. 
In the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program case set out 
above, for example, the policy-program linkages estab-
lish the program’s objective of preventing soil erosion, 
improving water quality and preserving wildlife habitat 
as needed to uphold the overall policy aim of conserv-
ing ecosystem services through the use of financial in-
centives encouraging conservation. ‘Program-measure 
linkages’, on the other hand, establish the need to fit 
program mechanisms to specific on-the-ground policy 
measures. In the CRP case, this involves ensuring pay-
ment agreements between the Government and land-
owners reflect the priorities given to the conservation 
of different land types and to monitor how successfully 
these agreements are implemented in practice through 
the fair assessment of yearly payments and contract 
lengths, for example. 
Principles and practices of program design related 
to these two general areas of concern are set out in 
more detail below. 
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Table 3. Program Level “Needs” for Effective Design. 
Policy Content 
High-Level Abstraction 
(Policy-Level) 
Policy–
Program 
Linkages 
(I) 
Operationalization (Program-
Level) 
Program–
Measure 
Linkages (II) 
On-the-Ground Specifi-
cation (Measures-Level) 
POLICY GOALS 
What ideas govern policy 
development? 
 
INSTRUMENT LOGIC 
What norms guide imple-
mentation preferences? 
OBJECTIVES 
What does the policy formally 
aim to address? 
 
MECHANISMS 
What are the specific types of 
policy instruments or ele-
ments are how are they uti-
lized? 
SETTINGS 
What are the specific 
aims of policy? 
 
CALIBRATIONS 
What are the specific 
ways for using the in-
struments? 
 
4. Principles for Designing Programs: Policy-Program 
Linkages (I) 
Studies over the past two decades exploring ‘smart 
regulation’ in environment policy and in land use man-
agement and planning (Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sin-
clair, 1998; Rayner & Howlett, 2009; Ben-Zadok, 2013) 
have helped underline the significance and effective-
ness of program designs that are compatible with exist-
ing governance conditions. Borne out of such studies, 
several principles have emerged to illustrate and in-
struct how effective policy-program linkages can be de-
signed.  
4.1. Goodness of Fit: Matching Governance Mode and 
Policy Capacities 
One such principle is the notion of ‘goodness of fit”. 
That is, as set out above, effective program designs 
need to reflect and respond to the specific contextual 
features of the particular policy sector(s) that they in-
volve. How well a program is able to align itself with 
context-dependent policy realities determines its 
“goodness of fit” within an existing governance struc-
ture and the various other policy regime elements at 
the international, national, sub-national and local lev-
els of governments within which it is embedded (How-
lett, 2011). Different governance styles and prefer-
ences at each level require and influence specific types 
of state and social actor capacities and capabilities and 
these limitations and strengths inform judgments 
about the feasibility of program-level options and al-
ternative arrangements of objectives and mechanisms. 
Questions of goodness of fit thus connect program 
design with a central concern of policy analysis, the ex 
ante feasibility of instruments and their settings in a 
larger political context (Meltsner, 1972; Majone, 1989). 
While it is true that program designs that might appear 
infeasible in terms of goodness of fit can subsequently 
turn out to be effective (or else policy innovation 
would be an even more rare occurrence than it actually 
is), judgments about feasibility are an established fea-
ture of policy advice. For example, studies of govern-
ance modes and ‘policy styles’, mostly stemming from 
Europe and North America throughout the 1980s–
1990s (see for example, Richardson, Gustafsson, & Jor-
dan, 1982; Freeman, 1985; Kiss & Neij, 2011) described 
several common patterns of governance arrangements 
that need to be reflected in policy program designs in 
order for these designs to be considered feasible and 
thus improve their chances of adoption. While many 
possible permutations and combinations of such gov-
ernance arrangements exist, recent policy and adminis-
trative studies have focused on four basic types or 
“governance modes” found in many jurisdictions (see 
Table 4). 
Each mode of governance listed in Table 1 broadly 
displays a different focus, form of control, aim and pre-
ferred service delivery mechanism and procedural poli-
cy orientation which affect and inform design practices 
and contents. Government actions through legal and 
network governance, for example, can change many 
aspects of policy behaviour but do so indirectly 
through the alteration of the relationships existing be-
tween different kinds of social actors. This is unlike 
corporate and market governance, each of which in-
volves a preference for more overt state direction. The 
program elements of policy designs must incorporate 
knowledge about these particular characteristics and 
preferences if they are to be considered feasible or ap-
propriate.  
Claims and counterclaims about feasibility have a 
strongly rhetorical character and disputes over these 
claims is a characteristic feature of many design pro-
cesses. A key insight of contemporary research into the 
design of programs that successfully address policy 
aims is that designing involves thinking about and co-
ordinating aspects of policy arrangements which occur 
over multiple levels of policy activity (Howlett & del 
Rio, 2014). Activities at all of these levels, along with 
the details of implementation, must be coordinated 
and integrated if optimal results are to be attained.
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Table 4. Different Governance Modes and Policy Capacity Considerations. 
Mode of 
Governance 
Central Focus of 
Governance 
Activity 
Form of  State 
Control of 
Governance 
Relationships 
Overall 
Governance  
Aim 
Prime Service 
Delivery 
Mechanism 
Key Procedural 
Tool for Policy 
Implementation 
Legal 
Governance 
Legality - 
Promotion of law 
and order in social 
relationships 
Legislation, Law 
and Rules 
Legitimacy - 
Voluntary 
Compliance  
Rights - Property, 
Civil, Human 
Courts and 
Litigation 
Corporate 
Governance 
Management - of 
Major Organized 
Social Actors 
Plans Controlled and 
Balanced Rates of 
Socio-economic 
Development 
Targets - 
Operational 
Objectives 
Specialized and 
Privileged Advisory 
Committees 
Market 
Governance 
Competition - 
Promotion of Small 
and Medium sized 
Enterprises 
Contracts and 
Regulations 
Resource/Cost 
Efficiency and 
Control 
Prices - Controlling 
for Externalities, 
Supply and 
Demand 
Regulatory Boards, 
Tribunals and 
Commissions 
Network 
Governance 
Promotion of Inter-
actor 
organizational 
Activity 
Collaboration Co-Optation of 
Dissent and Self-
Organization of 
Social Actors 
Networks of 
Governmental,  
and Non-
Government 
Organizations 
Subsides and 
Expenditures on 
Network Brokerage 
Activities 
Source: Considine & Lewis, 2003. 
Not surprisingly, while the level of concern for match-
ing governance context and program elements is al-
ways high it becomes even more complex and charged 
when the policy or program area extends beyond the 
jurisdiction of a single level of government to incorpo-
rate such multi-level governance (MLG) considerations. 
This is well illustrated by the case of environmental 
policy-making and program design across the nations 
of the European Union (EU) after 1960. In many of 
these countries a previous penchant for the use of reg-
ulatory and command-and-control instruments aligned 
with more active forms of state governance have given 
way to more market-based tools as governance ar-
rangements in general at the EU level have shifted in 
this direction (Jordan, 2005). However within this gen-
eral tendency a great variety now exists today in the 
EU with respect to the type of market or economic-
based tools preferred in each individual member coun-
try (Jordan, 2005). For example, evaluations of envi-
ronmental policy program arrangements have high-
lighted that moves towards planning and ‘steering’ in 
such contexts involve indirect co-ordination of key ac-
tors by governments, requiring “a high level of gov-
ernment policy capacity to identify and utilize specific 
policy tools capable of successful moving policy targets 
in a required direction” (Howlett & Rayner, 2013; Arts, 
Leroy, & van Tatenhove, 2006). Nordic nations which 
have corporatist governance conditions and fiscal and 
other capacities that allow a better fit with ‘second-
generation’ market based instruments (MBIs) such as 
emissions trading, whereas less-wealthy European 
countries “are still employing first-generation MBIs 
such as simple effluent taxes and user charges” (Jor-
dan, 2005, p. 486). “Goodness of fit” involving judg-
ments about the feasibility of program elements within 
overall governance arrangements thus plays a key role 
in designing effective programs both in state-level ju-
risdictions and at the EU level. Better program designs 
ensure programs content and pre-requisite conditions 
match governance contexts. 
4.2. Degrees of Freedom: The Impact of Layering 
However, as the EU case also shows, even with a high 
capacity for action, not all possible program options 
may be available to designers. A second design consid-
eration is thus one directed at the relative ease or diffi-
culty with which policy designers can change the status 
quo given the embeddedness or tractability of past pol-
icy and program choices. Conceptually, if unlimited 
‘degrees of freedom’ are available to policy-makers 
then any combination of policy tools and program ob-
jectives might be possible in any circumstance (Howlett 
& Rayner, 2013). However, practical experience with 
large-scale institutional changes has suggested that the 
existence of this amount of ‘elbow-room’ for mixing or 
designing policy elements is uncommon and many pro-
gram design contexts are, rather, heavily ‘path de-
pendent’ (Pierson, 2000; David, 2005). 
Other than in completely new areas of policy, or in 
cases where political punctuations have led to a full re-
think or overhaul of old policy, most policy and pro-
gram designers typically work with restricted ‘degrees 
of freedom’ or within constraints created by layers of 
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already existing policy mixes that cannot be easily al-
tered (Thelen, 2003; van der Heijden, 2011). As cor-
roborated by evidence from studies of the evolution of 
sectors such as welfare policy and natural resources 
over long periods of time, many existing policy combi-
nations developed incrementally through a gradual his-
torical process of the piecemeal addition or alteration 
of elements of policies and programmes (Lindblom, 
1959; Howlett & Migone, 2011). Such mixes may be 
‘disorganized (Bode, 2006) and cry out for rationalization 
but are nevertheless difficult to change (Hacker, 2005). 
Many sustainability strategies, for example, have 
suffered from incremental adjustment through layer-
ing, or the process whereby new elements are simply 
added to an existing regime without abandoning previ-
ous ones (van der Heijden, 2011; Thelen, 2003). Many 
efforts at the integration of various resource manage-
ment regimes, for instance, have failed when powerful 
interests are able to keep favourable goals, instru-
ments and settings, such as unsustainable fishing or 
timber cutting quotas that support an industry, and 
limit the impact of new policy initiatives (Rayner & 
Howlett, 2009). 
The temporality of these policy development pro-
cesses place constraints on contemporary designers 
and like the governance contexts cited above, is a key 
issue in program design. The deadweight of the past 
necessitates the examination of the pre-existing histor-
ical organization of policy components in order to 
gauge the feasibility of moving specific design options 
forward (Christensen, Laegreid, & Wise, 2002). Effec-
tive program design must take these temporal contexts 
into account in proposing new remedies; often leading 
to an emphasis on “patching” policy rather than ‘re-
packaging’ it altogether (Howlett, Mukherjee, & Woo, 
2014; Howlett & Rayner, 2013). 
5. Principles for Designing Programs: Program-
Measure Linkages (II) 
Effective program design must address both policy-
program level and the program-measure level of inter-
actions among program elements (see Table 3). On the 
ground program elements often involve aspects of 
what Elinor Ostrom (2011; Ostrom & Basurto, 2011) 
designated as the ‘rules’ of institutional design and 
analysis. These include designing program components 
which cover aspects such as: 
 Boundary rules: Who is covered by this program? 
Is participation and coverage automatic or is a new 
participant allowed to join paying some kind of en-
try charge, fee or tax? 
 Position rules: How does an actor move from being 
a target of a program activities to one with a spe-
cialized task in program implementation, such as 
the chair of a management committee?  
 Scope rules: What activities are covered by the 
program?  
 Choice rules: What choices do various types of ac-
tors have in relation to the actions they can or are 
expected to take in the program?  
 Aggregation rules: What understandings exist con-
cerning how actors can affect or alter the rules af-
fecting their actions. Do certain actions require 
prior permission from, or agreement of, others?  
 Information rules: What information about the 
program or relevant to it is held secret, and what 
information is made public?  
 Payoff rules: How large are the sanctions that can 
be imposed for breaking any of the rules identified 
above? How is conformance to rules monitored? 
Who is responsible for sanctioning nonconform-
ers? How reliably are sanctions imposed? Are any 
positive rewards offered? (Ostrom, 2011, pp. 20-
21). 
Achieving effectiveness with respect to deploying 
program mechanisms at this level relies upon ensuring 
mechanisms, calibrations, objectives and settings dis-
play ‘coherence’, ‘consistency’ and ‘congruence’ with 
each other (Howlett & Rayner, 2007). Within this gen-
eral rubric, however, several specific principles of ef-
fective program design also exist. Two of these—
maximizing complementary effects and the need to 
balance the attainment of equity, efficiency, economy 
and environmental concerns—are discussed below. 
5.1. Maximizing Complementary Effects  
Policy design studies have pointed out that many exist-
ing policy mixes are not comprised exclusively of tools 
or elements that complement and enhance each other 
(Grabosky, 1995). Grabosky (1995) and other scholars 
investigating policy combinations throughout the latter 
half of the 1990s, for example, noted that policy pack-
ages and programs combining command-and-control 
regulation with modes of voluntary compliance can be 
internally contradictory and should be avoided in effec-
tive design.  
One key principle at this level of design analysis and 
practice, therefore, is to maximize complementary re-
lationships while mitigating incompatibility between 
policy elements in the formulation of policy portfolios 
(Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, 1998). Evidence 
from the drive for renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency as a consequence of climate change and energy 
security concerns in the last two decade, for example, 
has shown that internally conflicting elements of policy 
mixes often elicit contradictory responses from those 
who are the targets of a program (Del Rio, Silvosa, & 
Gomez, 2011; Boonekamp, 2006). This finding is com-
mon in many sectors where using both regulation and 
voluntary compliance measures in the same program 
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at the same time undermined the realization of an in-
tended program objective. While some programs can 
contain duplicative elements and the redundancy or 
resiliency inherent in them may actually help to ensure 
that the stated policy goals are achieved, in most cases 
this is not the result (Grabosky, 1995; Braathen, 2005; 
Braathen, 2007). Rather, as Hou and Brewer (2011) 
have noted, programs composed of tools that com-
plement or supplement each other—for example, the 
use of command and control regulation to prevent un-
desirable behaviour while simultaneously providing fi-
nancial incentives to encourage desirable behaviour—
will normally achieve more effective policy responses.  
5.2. Balancing Equity, Efficiency, Economy and 
Environmental Concerns 
A second concern centers less on policy tools and their 
calibrations and more on program ‘settings’ or the op-
erationalization of specific program objectives. Numer-
ous case studies of programs, including social policy 
experience in Australia and United States, have sug-
gested that attaining four general principles in program 
design at the program-measure interface is critical for 
program effectiveness: namely achieving “equity, effi-
ciency, economy and environment” in program design 
(Stanton & Herscovitch, 2013). 
In the context of programs such as those involving 
progressive taxation, social security benefits, health in-
surance and retirement incomes, for example, equity is 
understood to have both a proportional (based on dif-
ferent resource endowments of policy targets) and 
equal (equal treatment of targets with similar endow-
ments) component and a superior program design 
takes both aspects into account. For example, pro-
posals for national disability insurance programs in 
Australia involved a setting of ‘proportionality’ or une-
qual treatment of policy targets based on different de-
grees of disabilities. However it also included an equity 
component in fostering equal treatment of the same 
disability across the nation (Stanton & Herscovitch, 
2013). Addressing ‘efficiency’ as part of a policy pro-
gram also often takes the shape of meeting larger eco-
nomic goals while also attaining environmental goals 
such as sustained growth. Returning to the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program (CRP) example cited above, one 
of the main critiques of the scheme was that once the 
contracts were signed, farmers were locked in to con-
tracts without any scope for regular inflation adjust-
ments. Designing inflation adjustment mechanisms in-
to the CRP could address this shortcoming in the 
program’s efficiency and enhance its environmental ef-
fectiveness. 
The principle of ‘economy’ relates to matching the 
cost of program initiatives and elements to budgetary 
and personnel resources and balancing these two as-
pects. But as Justen, Schippl, Lenz, & Fleischer (2014) 
and Justen, Fearnley, Givoni, & Macmillen (2014) note, 
participation is a key component in policy and program 
design, not just for legitimation purposes, but because 
it can bring new information to the design process 
which formal analyses can miss. Meeting the need for 
participatory and inclusive collaboration in policy pro-
gram design can be attained by managing the coexist-
ence of demand-side and supply-side policies and their 
constituent policy actors (Daugbjerg & Sonderskov, 
2012). This is especially the case in programs pertaining 
to the deployment of new technologies such as renew-
able energy and energy efficiency which require the 
coordinated participation of both producers and con-
sumers. Along the same vein, encouraging collabora-
tive ties between different types of policy actors can 
make programs more effective by strengthening 
knowledge linkages and fostering innovation.  
Several design techniques exist which can help 
promote effective program designs meeting these 
goals and their combination. As Sovacool (2012) noted 
in his assessment of ten renewable energy programs in 
developing countries, mutually supportive combina-
tions can be encouraged while others are discouraged 
or changed on a pilot or experimental basis. That is, 
“effective programs typically begin with pilot programs 
or with feasibility assessments before installing sys-
tems and scaling up to larger production or distribution 
volumes” (p. 9159). Such pilot programs need to be 
carefully protected from political pressure to evaluate 
them prematurely, causing adoption of program ele-
ments that subsequently prove problematic or rejec-
tion of those with latent value, a problem recognized 
early on in the literature on program evaluation (Weiss, 
1970). 
6. Summary: Towards Effective Program Design  
Policy design is an activity conducted by a range of pol-
icy actors at different levels of policy-making in the 
hope of improving policy-making and policy outcomes 
through the accurate anticipation of the consequences 
of government actions and the articulation of specific 
courses of action to be followed to achieve different 
levels of policy goals and ambitions. In a program de-
sign perspective this is to be accomplished by improv-
ing assessments of both the theoretical effectiveness as 
well as the feasibility of policy alternatives at both the pol-
icy-program level and the program-measures interface.  
That is, each “policy” or program is a complex ‘re-
gime’ or arrangement of abstract, operationalized and 
on-the-ground ends and means-related content which 
exists in a specific governance setting and which 
change over time. In contrast to an older tradition of 
program design and evaluation which tended to treat 
programs in isolation from the larger policy context, 
the discussion here has located program design firmly 
within the context of designing complete policy pack-
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ages. In this perspective the central concerns in the de-
sign of programs are related to answering questions 
about how mixes of policy components are constructed, 
which methods yield superior results in developing these 
mixes and what is the likely result of their (re)design.  
Contemporary design discussions at the policy-
program level center on the articulation of principles 
such as “goodness of fit” in policy formulation, govern-
ance and steering, and the ‘degrees of freedom’ which 
formulators or designers have in carrying out their 
work both over space and over time. These comple-
ment and advance notions at the program-mechanism 
level promoting parsimony in program designs and the 
need for coherence, consistency and congruence in de-
sign relationships and components. At this level efforts 
have been made to articulate various methods through 
which designs can meet concerns for equity, efficiency, 
economy and environmental quality while maximizing 
complementary interactive effects and minimizing 
negative or counter-productive ones. 
Table 5 summarizes the design principles set out 
above which can help ensure better policy and program 
integration through improved linkages between different 
policy components at the two levels cited above. 
What this article has highlighted is that by under-
standing the nesting of effective program design at the 
two levels of policy-program and program-measures, 
program designers can improve or optimize their de-
signs in given historical and institutional contexts. Un-
derstanding governance arrangements and how past 
policy processes have created and modified the ele-
ments of existing programs is critical to evaluating the 
chances of success of policy rules and on-the-ground 
measures in accomplishing higher level goals and objec-
tives. This realization is helping contemporary program 
designers in their efforts to deal with policy problems 
that increasingly demand complex governmental re-
sponses. 
Table 5. Balancing Policy Elements for Effective Program Design. 
Policy Content 
High-Level Abstrac-
tion (Policy-Level) 
Policy-Program 
Linkages 
Operationalization 
(Program-Level) 
Program – Measures 
Linkages 
On-the-Ground 
Specification 
(Measures-Level)) 
GOALS 
What ideas govern pol-
icy development? 
 
LOGIC 
What norms guide im-
plementation prefer-
ences? 
Goodness of Fit with 
 Governance styles 
(legal, corporate, mar-
ket or network); 
 Existing state capac-
ities and social capabil-
ities 
 Multi-level policy-
making 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 Working within con-
straints and existing 
layers of policy com-
ponent mixes 
 Accounting for tem-
porality and historical 
arrangements of poli-
cies 
OBJECTIVES 
What does the policy 
formally aim to ad-
dress? 
 
MECHANISMS 
What are the specific 
types of policy instru-
ments or elements are 
how are they utilized? 
Maximizing Comple-
mentary Effects 
 Assessing interac-
tions between multiple 
policy components 
 Reducing internally 
conflicting elements 
and attaining coher-
ence, consistency and 
congruence between 
program elements and 
measures 
 
Balancing the ‘4 Es’ in 
policy settings 
 Equity (both propor-
tionality and equality) 
 Efficiency (alignment 
with economic goals 
such as employment 
and growth) 
 Economy (managing 
budgetary costs) 
 Environmental Con-
cerns (maintaining sus-
tainability of programs) 
SETTINGS 
What are the specific 
aims of policy? 
 
CALIBRATIONS 
What are the specific 
ways for using the in-
strument? 
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